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CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND AUDITOR SWITCHING
Abstract
While evidence exists which suggests that takeovers/mergers do not result
in a switch of auditor by the target, there is no well specified theory which 
describes relationships between auditor switches and corporate takeover activity. 
Two sets of hypotheses are developed which relate attributes of firms on both 
sides of the takeover transaction and the nature of the takeover per se to the 
propensity for switching the target ’s auditor to that of the acquiror. The first
set predicts that the auditor of a target will be switched, the smaller the
differences in the production-investment opportunity sets between the acquiror 
and the target. The auditor of the target will be retained the greater the
relative expertise of the target ’s auditor (compared with the acquiror’s auditor) 
in the target ’s production-investment opportunity sets. The tests offer only
weak support for the hypotheses. The second set of hypotheses relate switching 
to the takeover process and predict that the target ’s auditor will be switched
the greater the control of the target obtained by the acquiror and the greater 
the resistance of the target ’s management to the takeover. Again the results
are not strongly supportive. Some possible explanations for the weak results are
examined including horizontal and vertical takeover motivations and auditors as 
acquisition specialists.
1CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND AUDITOR SWITCHING 
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper invest igates the relat ionship between takeovers and the
decision to subsequently reta in  or change the auditor  of the ta rge t  company 
when the takeover  is successful. The evidence in both Austral ia ,1 and the
U.S.A., supports the proposition that  takeovers operate as a value increasing 
mechanism for equity holders of ta rge t  companies. However,  the evidence with 
respect to acquiror (bidding) firms is not nearly as conclusive. Most studies 
have repor ted  that  the average abnormal returns to acquirors is close to zero,
suggesting that  the market for corporate control is competit ive [Dodd 1986, p.
351]. However as Dodd points out, what these broad s ta t i s t ica l  averages 
conceal is that  particular acquisitions can be accompanied by ei ther  a gain or 
loss to the acquiror depending on the marke t ’s perception of whether  or not 
the particular acquisition will be value increasing. To avoid this discounting of 
firm value, rat ional  managers of the acquiror would be expected to take
actions consistent with their  intention to not only realize stockholders’ 
expectat ions with respect to returns from acquiring the targe t ,  but to also 
preserve the claims of exist ing (bidder) stockholders post-acquisi t ion.
While potent ia l  sources of value increases3 on both the acquiror and 
ta rge t  sides of the acquisition transaction have been suggested,  the re does not
Walter  (1984), Bishop et al. (1987).
See Jensen and Rubacks’ (1983) review of U.S.A. Studies.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) identify potentia l  reductions in production or 
distribution costs from e.g. realising economies of scale, vertical 
integrat ion,  adoption of a more efficient production or organisat ion 
technology and reduction in agency costs as possible sources of value 
creation.  The stockholder wealth reducing a t tr ibu tes  of free cash flow 
in takeovers is discussed by Jensen (1986).
appear to have been any a t ten tion  paid to the role of ta rge t  auditor  choice 
in the process. The choice of auditor  can be viewed as a contracting cost 
reducing mechanism in the firm [Ball 1988, Watts and Zimmerman 1986] and 
the decision to reta in  or switch the auditor  of a ta rge t  company following
contract ing for the acquisition of the ta rge t  could also be directed at increases 
in acquiror and ta rge t  firm value.
The issue inves t igated in this paper is whether  a t tr ibu tes  of the
acquiror or ta rge t ,  or the takeover process itself,  emerge as de terminants  of 
the auditor  choice decision in these circumstances. If the t a rg e t ’s management 
can choose an ineff icient auditor  lacking ei ther  the required competence and/or 
independence, then takeovers motivated by replacement of inefficient 
management could be expected to result in ta rge t  auditor  replacement also. 
Although there  is some evidence in the U.S.A. which suggests  that  the auditor  
retention/switch decision is not determined by takeovers [Chow and Rice 1982], 
casual observation of takeover act ivity suggests that auditor  switching and
takeover act ivity are associated.4
Consequently,  this paper has two purposes. First,  it addresses the more 
general  issue of the value tha t  the auditor  brings to the firm and how that 
value might change in the takeover situation.  Second, it provides empirical
evidence about firm a t tr ibu tes  and de te rminants  of auditor  choice in 
circumstances of successful takeovers.  The remainder of the paper  is
Takeover act ivity is likely to be biased toward an auditor  switch in 
Austral ia  because auditors of the ta rge t  are required to re t i re  on
becoming a subsidiary (S280C14) Companies Act 1981). The auditors can 
make themselves available for renomination. Apart from this regulation,  
we are unaware  of any other  regulation which would e i ther  directly or 
indirectly affect  the acquiror’s choice of a subsidiary’s auditor  during the 
time period selected for our study.
3structured as follows. The next section develops the argument on determinants  
of switches immediately a f te r  takeovers and presents  the hypotheses.  The 
sample selection and research design are described in section 3 and the 
empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides some 
explanations for the anomolous results.
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING TARGET AUDITOR SWITCHES AFTER
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
Within the theory of the firm (see Coase 1937) an emerging body of 
evidence supports the proposition that  the choices of accounting methods are 
endogenous to a contract ing equilibrium [Zimmer 1986, Whittred 1987]. These 
choices are made as par t  of the contract  solution to ex ante  res tr ict  wealth 
transfers  by claimholders. Ball (1988, p. 30) art iculates the theory to the 
auditor  choice problem. Auditor  choice involves selecting a contractual ly 
"accepted" technology to adjudicate on those part icular  accounting methods used 
in contracting between the claimholders on the firm. The audi tor’s adjudication 
role is played out ex post, i.e., a f te r  the contracts are in place, to determine 
the allocation of the wealth among the claimholders. This leads to the
proposition that the demand for auditing is an increasing function of the cost
of pre-speci fy ing the firm’s accounting methods for all feasible future s ta tes
[Ball 1988, p. 32].
While these general  s tat emen ts about the role of the auditor are
sufficient to describe an equilibrium with respect to minimization of firm
contract ing costs, they are incomplete in that they do not describe the process 
by which a contract ing equilibrium is restored,  and the par t  the auditor  plays 
in that  res to rat ion  when the contractual  configurat ion of the firm changes
4markedly, as can be the case with a takeover.  As will be shown in this 
section, within the theory of the firm at least two possible explanations can 
be offered for actions with respect  to the decision to switch or retain the
ta rg e t ’s auditor.
The f irst argument predicts that the t a rg e t ’s auditor  will be retained  if
the production-inves tment  opportunity set of the acquiror and the ta rge t  are 
different .  If an acquiror takes over a ta rge t ,  then the value of the t a rg e t ’s 
incumbent auditor  is not only an increasing function of the cost of the 
acquiror pre-specify ing the t a rg e t ’s accounting methods for all possible future 
states,  but also of the cost of the acquiror’s auditor  adjudicat ing as the s ta tes  
are revealed in the new firm. Anderson and Stokes (1989) argue that  the 
variat ion in the production-inves tment  decisions (and the associated contracts 
tha t  const i tute auditee firms) induces a demand for diversi ty in auditors, i.e.,
audit technologies for monitoring and arbi trat ing.  If a t a rg e t ’s production- 
investment decisions are d if ferent  from those tha t  the acquiror’s auditor  has 
monitored or a rb i t ra ted  upon previously, then it is less likely tha t  the acquiror 
will switch the t a rg e t ’s auditor  to the acquiror’s auditor.  On the other  hand, 
if there  is less variat ion between the acquiror and ta rge t  immediately 
preceeding the takeover,  it is more likely that  an acquiror will switch the
t a rg e t ’s auditor  to be replaced by the acquiror’s auditor.  The line of 
argument leads to predictions of both the propensi ty to switch auditors of 
ta rge ts  and the choice of the replacement auditor:
HI  Acquirors are more likely to switch the ta rg e t s ’ auditors to the 
acquirors’ auditors, the smaller the differences in the production-  
investment opportunity sets between the acquirors and their respective 
targets.
5The second argument addresses differences in auditors. Auditors are
observed to specialize according to the a t tr ibu tes  of their  clients [Arne tt  and 
Danos 1979, Eichenseher and Danos 1981], so re ten tion  of the t a rg e t ’s auditor  
would be expected when the ta rg e t ’s auditor  demonstrates some comparative 
advantage (relative to the acquiror’s auditor) in the audit. Optimal aud i to r -  
auditee contracting implies that  the incumbent audit firm of the ta rge t  is in 
tha t  position because it is the efficient supplier of an audit technology, given
the production- investment opportunity set of the target .  However, the position 
of the auditor  of the acquiror is slightly different .  Where a takeover  reflects 
(sudden) variations in the production-inves tment  configurat ion of the acquiror, 
the auditor  will have to invest in new and d if ferent  productive factors to
maintain a comparat ive advantage in the supply of the audit to the new
"group". Failure by the auditor  to adapt  will result in loss of comparative
advantage and could result in replacement by another  supplier.
However,  in such takeovers the process of invest ing by the acquiror’s
auditor  is long run, and may not be executed contemporaneously with the
takeover.  During the "investment period" the acquiror’s auditor  may have an
incentive to promote re tention of the t a rg e t ’s auditor. The investment in
technology by the acquiror’s auditor  is fur ther  complicated by the auditor  
holding a portfol io of auditees.  Changes for one audi tee may be insufficient
inducement for the auditor  to invest in an expanded audit technology to
encompass the new subsidiary. The extent  of expected returns and costs from
investing in the new audit technology across cl ients will be important
considerations. The investment in a new technology is made by the auditor
only to the extent  that  it is expected to be value increasing for the audit
firm. If the investment is not worthwhile,  again the acquiror’s auditor  may
promote re tention of the t a rg e t ’s auditor. This argument implies:
H2 Acquirors are less likely to switch the targets’ auditors to the acquirors’ 
auditors, the greater the expertise of the targets’ auditors in the 
targets’ production-investment opportunity sets relative to their acquirors’ 
auditors.
A corollary to the propositions is that where an acquiror and target 
have the same auditor prior to the takeover, it is unlikely that a switch will 
take place after the takeover. Since auditors specialize in auditing 
technologies, the fact that the acquiror and target both have the same auditor 
would indicate that the differences between the production-investment 
opportunity sets of the two auditees would be low. However, the implications 
of this argument are not particularly interesting. It would be expected that 
the frequency of common acquiror and target auditors would be low even when 
the production-investment opportunity sets are very similar for reasons related 
to auditees’ aversion to auditors of close competitors [Danos and Eichenseher 
1988], In short, we are suggesting that the existence of close substitutes in 
auditing technologies is sufficient to denote different suppliers. However, when 
the auditors of the acquiror and target are the same in such takeovers the 
auditor has an additional function as a broker between the acquiror and 
target. A broker is an intermediary between the contracting parties and is 
selected to reduce the costs of contracting between the parties. Consistent 
with the contracting theory explanation advanced here, auditors that are 
brokers are valued as contracting cost reducing mechanisms. This suggests that 
acquirors with the same auditors as their targets prior to the takeover, are 
less likely to switch the targets’ auditors after the takeover.
The extent of control the acquiror has over a target could also affect 
the decision to switch the auditor. The lower the percentage of control of a
7ta rge t  that  has passed to the acquiror, the g rea te r  the pressure the minority 
in te res t  holders may exert  upon the acquiror to retain the t a rg e t ’s auditor. 
Consistent with the contracting theory explanation advanced here,  the acquiror 
may not switch the t a rg e t ’s auditor  in order to reduce the costs of contracting 
with the minority in teres t  holders. This suggests:
H3 Acquirors are more likely to switch ta rge ts ’ auditors to the acquirors’
auditors, the g rea te r  the control obtained over targets .
The propensity to switch to the acquiror’s auditor  could depend upon any 
action the t a rg e t ’s management takes to resist the takeover  by the acquiror. 
If the takeover  is "hostile" i.e., the ta rg e t ’s management resists the takeover,5
the acquiror is less likely to retain the t a rg e t ’s management and auditor.
There is evidence that  auditors assist in defensive actions taken by ta rge ts  in 
these hostile takeovers  [Trotman 1981, Casey and Eddey 1986]. In such 
"hostile" takeovers it is more likely that  the acquiror will replace the t a rg e t ’s 
incumbent management with the acquiror’s management and the incumbent 
auditor  of the ta rge t  is likely to be of lower value to the acquiror because 
assistance in the "hostile" defence could signal lower auditor  independence (and 
higher agency costs for shareholders)  and consequently the incumbent is 
switched. This suggests that ta rge ts  with management tha t  resist the 
takeovers,  are more likely to have their  auditors  switched by the acquiror to 
the acquiror’s auditor  a f te r  the takeover:
H4 Acquirors are more likely to switch the ta rg e t s ’ auditors to the
acquirors’ auditors where the ta rge t s ’ management resists  the takeover.
T As distinct from the t a rg e t ’s management opposing the takeover  to elicit 
a higher price from the acquiror.
83. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Operationalising Variables
With respect to tests  of the firs t hypothesis, there is the problem with 
observing differences in production-investm ent opportunity sets  (see Smith and 
Warner 1979, p. 153) and proxies for such differences alone would be expected 
to be noisy. However, as the auditor represents  part of the interface 
betw een production-investm ent decisions within the firm and claimholder 
payoffs, this implies tha t the auditor is skilled not only in observing s ta tes  
revealed by the particular production-investm ent decisions of the firm, but also 
in mapping s ta te  revelation  to claimholder contracts. In short, the auditor is
skilled both in production-investm ent decisions of the firm and contracts 
implied by those decisions and this suggests proxy variables be used for both 
of these a t tr ibu tes .  This proposition is consistent with auditors becoming 
industry specialists [A rnett and Danos 1979, Eichenseher and Danos 1981].
Accordingly, if d iffe ren t production-investm ent decisions derive a demand 
for d iffe ren t governance structures to minimize contracting costs, variations in 
firms’ capital s tructures would be expected to exhibit consistency with 
variations in production-investm ent decisions. Following Myers (1977), 
investments which are reflected  by a s s e ts - in -p la c e  are more likely to be able 
to support debt. In contrast "intangible" assets  which are highly specific to 
the firms’ operations will reflec t options on investments in fu ture  periods and 
are less likely to support debt (and are the re fo re  more likely to be equity 
financed). Empirical regularities  betw een  tangibility  of investments and capital 
s tructure have been observed (e.g. Long and Malitz 1981, Zimmer 1986) in
support of the proposition. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 360) propose that 
the tangibility of a firm’s investments also is re la ted  to the specification of a 
firm’s accounting procedure choice set.
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Two variables are the re fo re  used to proxy for differences in production- 
investment opportunity sets in the auditees. These variables are takeover type 
(classifying the takeover according to w hether the acquisition of a ta rg e t ’s 
investments represents  a horizontal, vertical or an unrela ted  addition to the 
investments of the acquiror) and secured leverage. With respect to the first 
variable, where the acquisition represents  a horizontal in tegra tion  (between 
firms in a common industry), the acquiror is more likely to switch the ta rg e t ’s 
auditor to tha t of the acquiror. The second variable is used to estim ate the
degree of specificity of the firms’ investments. The implication is that 
differences in the type of debt will be indicative of d ifferences in the type 
of investments (growth options and a sse ts - in -p la c e )  of the firm. A distinction 
which is im portant here is tha t the type of debt is im portant but the quantity  
is less so. Two firms with d iffe ren t investments may both have a comparable 
quantity  of debt in their capital structures. However, one of the firms may 
have low specificity assets which will be represen ted  by unsecured debt while 
another may have more specific assets represen ted  by secured debt. In o ther
words, the "noise" induced by a leverage per se variable would be expected to 
be large. The measures on these and the o ther  variables are described below. 
The experim ental variables were measured as follows:
Hypothesis
H I Takeover Rating (RATING). A rating was obta ined of the ex ten t to 
which each takeover represen ted  a horizontal takeover. This was done 
by preparing a list of the takeovers in the sample and requesting 
experts  to provide a seven point scaled rating of w hether the takeovers
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involved a horizontal (defined as two firms being in a common industry) 
as distinct from a vertical  (defined as the two firms being in rela ted  
industries) or conglomerate integrat ion (defined as two firms being in 
unrela ted  industries). This proceeded by requesting a senior analyst in 
an investment house to initially provide the rat ing (without,  of course, 
the hypothesis or even the general  purpose of  the research being 
disclosed). He ra ted  all the takeovers that  he was familiar  with, then 
discussed those as well as the others with colleague analysts that  had
experience with the o ther  takeovers in the sample. The smaller the
rating, the more horizontal the takeover  and the more likely a switch of
auditor.
HI Absolute differences in the secured leverage rat ios be tween the acquiror
and ta rge t  (DIFSD). The secured leverage rat io was measured from 
company annual reports  as the rat io of total  mortgages and debentures 
to to ta l  shareholders’ equity in the year prior  to the takeover.  The 
smaller the absolute differences in the ratios,  the more likely a switch 
of auditor.
H2 The variable differences between the t a rg e t ’s and acquiror's auditors 
share of audit fees in the t a rg e t ’s industry (DIFSHARE) was used as a
proxy of auditor  expert ise in the t a rg e t ’s production- inves tment  
opportunity sets. The Austral ian Stock Exchange industry classifications 
were used to identify the ta rg e t ’s industry and available audit fee data  
[Trout and Wells (1984, 1985)] were used to measure an auditor’s share 
of audit fees in that  industry in the year prior to the takeover.  The 
larger  the DIFSHARE (i.e. the larger  the ta rge t  audi tor’s share relative 
to the acquiror auditor’s share), the less likely a switch of auditor.
H3 Acquiror’s control obtained over the ta rge t  (AMTACQ). The AMTACQ
was obtained from the Centre for Independent  Studies (CIS) Takeover
11
Data Base and was measured as the percentage of the issued shares 
acquired as at the closing date of the takeover  offer.  The g rea te r  the 
AMTACQ, the more likely a switch of auditor.
H4 Target  resistance to takeover  (RECOMM). RECOMM was also obtained 
from the CIS Takeover Data  Base and was defined by the ta rge t  
management’s recommendation on accepting the takeover  o f fer  (= 1 if
recommended acceptance or no recommendation, 0 if rejected). The 
smaller RECOMM, the more likely a switch of auditor.
The dependent  variable (SWIT) was measured using a categorical variable (SWIT 
= 0 if there  is a switch to the acquiror’s auditor  in any of the two years 
following the takeover offer , = 1 if there is no switch).
3.2 Sample Selection and Research Method
The takeovers occurring between January 1978 through to June 1985 
were initially selected from the CIS Takeover Database.  The f inal sample of 
72 takeovers included those for which data on all the variables were available. 
The annual repor ts  of the acquirors and ta rge ts  for the financial year  ended 
immediately preceeding the takeover were examined to identify the incumbent 
auditors. This s tep was repea ted  for each of the two years following the 
takeover  offer  date in order to identify those takeovers where the acquiror’s 
auditor  replaced the t a rg e t ’s auditor  in the two year period.6
T It is a s ta tu to ry  requirement in Austral ia  (s285(3)(b) Companies Act 
1981) that  an acquiror company indicate whether  the auditor  of any 
subsidiary ( ta rge t)  is not the same as the auditor  of the acquiror.
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Univaria te tests
Table 1 reports  descript ive results for all variables for the "Switching", 
"Non Switching" and "Total" samples.
TABLE 1 HERE
The univariate ‘t ’ tests  on hypothesis HI are reported  in Table 2. The 
results are ambiguous in their  support for hypothesis HI. , Whilst the 
differences in the secured debt  of acquirors and ta rge ts  are smaller (as 
predicted) in the switching firms, the ratings are higher in switching firms (not 
as predicted). As a result fur ther  tests  were performed to check the 
reliabil ity of the rat ings by the experts.  Under the same instructions as the 
experts,  two graduate students  with access to considerable "source" material  
independently ra ted  the takeovers and their  rat ings correlated  with the 
experts.  The Pearson Product Moment correlations are .737 (experts/ s tudent  
ra te r  1) and .679 (experts/s tudent  r a te r  2) which are highly significant. In 
view of these correlations,  which are high by comparison with other  studies of 
exper t  judgment (see Libby 1981, chapter  3), we conclude that  this unexpected 
result is not due to unrel iabil ity in measurement procedures.
TABLE 2 HERE
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The test  of hypothesis H2 was res tr icted  to 7 takeovers where the 
auditors of the acquiror and ta rge t  were not the same. Only the takeovers in 
1984 and 1985 could be used in the test  because the audit fee da ta  required 
for the test  were only available for the years 1983 and 1984 proceeding these 
takeovers.  The results of tests  comparing the share of audit fees in a 
t a rg e t ’s industry do not support hypothesis H2. In the one takeover  where
the t a rg e t ’s auditor  was retained,  the acquiror’s auditor  had a larger  share of 
audit fees in the t a rg e t ’s industry (i.e. DIFSHARE was negative). In the 
other  six takeovers where the t a rg e t ’s auditor  was switched to that  of the 
acquiror’s, the t a rg e t ’s auditor  had a larger share of audit fees in the ta rg e t ’s 
industry (DIFSHARE was positive, mean = .30, s tandard deviat ion = .28). In 5 
of these 6 takeovers, the acquiror’s auditor  had no share of audit fees in the 
ta rg e t ’s industry.
A test  was performed on Table 3 to determine whether  acquirors with 
the same auditor  as their  ta rge ts  CSAMAUD = 1 if the same, 0 if not the 
same) were less likely to switch the ta rge ts ’ auditors.
TABLE 3 HERE
The results imply, as expected,  tha t  in those takeovers where the 
acquirors and ta rge ts  have the same auditor  pre the takeover,  the acquiror is 
less likely to switch the t a rg e t ’s auditor.
A test  of hypothesis H3 was made by comparing the AMTACQ variable 
(acquiror’s control  obtained over the ta rge t)  for the switching and non 
switching takeovers.  The analysis indicated that  there  are no significant
14
* 7differences between the groups (t ~ .240, p = .405, one- ta i led) ,  implying that  
percentage of control obtained in a takeover is not associated with the 
pract ice of switching the t a rg e t ’s auditor. This is perhaps not surprising given 
that  65 of the 72 takeovers were 100% takeovers.8
A test  of hypothesis H4 was made using the contingency Table 4 that 
re la tes the resistance by the t a rg e t ’s management to the takeover to the 
practice of switching.
TABLE 4 HERE
Applying conventional significance levels to this test  would indicate that 
there is no significant difference between the groups on the management 
recommendation variable.
Mann-Whitney test  significant at p = 0.590 Cone-tailed).
A more powerful  test  of this hypothesis requires identif ication of a 
la rger  sample of takeovers where the percentage of control acquired is 
less than 90%. In Austral ia,  once a company acquires 90% of the shares 
it is obliged by law to take up the remaining 10%.
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis
OLS regression estimates9 are reported in Table 5 for the sample of 72 
takeovers.10
TABLE 5 HERE
The extent to which the variables tested are independent is reflected in 
the correlation matrix in Table 6. There appear to be no problems with first 
order multicollinearity and the results are consistent with the univariate results 
reported earlier, although the significance of the absolute difference in secured 
debt (DIFSD) has increased and the recommendations of acceptance (RECOMM) 
are higher in switching firms (but not in the direction predicted).
TABLE 6 HERE
The DIFSHARE variable is omitted because observations were restricted 
to 7 takeovers only.
Noreen (1988) argues that for small samples (50 to 100) OLS performs 
at least as well as probit; hence the OLS estimates are reported. 
Virtually identical results were obtained for a probit analysis. The 
multiple regression was also run with cases deleted where the auditor of 
the target and the bidder were the same prior to the takeover (i.e. the 
regression had only four independent variables). Very similar t statistics 
on the regression coefficients were obtained; however the adjusted R 
square dropped from 0.375 to 0.035. Natural log and square root
transformations on the dependent variable and the independent variables 
DIFSD and AMTACQ made no material difference to the results.
16
5. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
There is limited support from the results for the hypotheses developed 
in this paper. With respect to our major tests,  contrary to our predictions we 
find the RATING variable to be significantly higher in switching firms while, 
consistent with our predictions, the secured debt  of acquirors and ta rge ts  is 
smaller. With respect  to RECOMM we also find recommendations of acceptance 
are higher in switching firms but not in the direction predicted.  In this 
section we offer  some potentia l  explanations for the ambiguous results .11
5.1 Modelling the Takeover Process per se
In a very general  sense, our predictions and experimental  design are 
inhibited by the fact that  the l i te ra ture  offers  l i t t le  to explain why particular 
takeovers occur (o ther  than the steri le  observation that  they are "positive net 
present  value investments") nor how they are ini t iated (in particular , whether  
the auditor  has any role in the search for targets).  There fore  we have no 
way of determining whether the takeovers in our sample occurred for reasons 
re la ted  to, say, inefficiencies in the management of the ta rge t  or synergies in 
the operat ions of the two parties ,  or whether  auditors have acted as 
"specialist acquisition advisers" in some cases.
In order to gain additional insights into factors which might be driving 
these apparently anomalous results,  six firms in the sample (for the 1984 
and 1985 takeover years)  were contacted.  In each case the firm was 
asked to describe factors  important  in the swi tch/retention  decision. 
Apar t  from description of certain  "firm specific" events which influenced 
the particular decision, no fur ther  general izable explanations could be 
established.
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5.2 Managerial and Auditor Inefficiencies
One possibility exists that auditor choice following a takeover is 
confounded by the appointment of an inefficient incumbent target auditor prior 
to the takeover. This is possible where inefficient managers of the target 
choose an auditor lacking the required competence and/or independence. 
Moreover, such auditors may attenuate managerial inefficiency through poor 
advice. Takeovers motivated by replacement of less efficient managers by 
more efficient managers could be expected to result in less efficient auditors 
being replaced by more efficient auditors in conjunction with management 
changes.
If vertical and conglomerate takeovers are more likely to be motivated 
by replacement of less efficient managers than horizontal takeovers, then this 
could contribute to the higher switching activity in the vertical and 
conglomerate takeovers than in the horizontal takeovers. The RECOMM
variable used in this study is potentially noisy in this regard because it does 
not distinguish hostility to a takeover from opposition to elicit a higher price 
from the acquiror. However, better proxies which attempt to capture the
effect of this explanation are not obvious. For example, a variable measuring 
management changes following takeovers does not discriminate takeovers 
motivated by replacement of less efficient managers from those motivated by 
removal of efficient but superfluous managers, e.g. in horizontal takeovers 
where economies of scale considerations are important.
Our significant result for RECOMM, in the opposite direction to that 
predicted, could be due in part to noise in distinguishing hostility to a 
takeover from opposition by management to elicit a higher price from the
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acquiror. If management of the ta rge t  resists  the takeover to elicit a higher 
and "acceptable" price or recommends acceptance where the bid is "correctly" 
priced, then the auditor  and management of the ta rge t  are more likely to be 
retained.
5.3 Auditors as Acquisition Specialists
Also possible is that  the defini t ion of auditor  competence with respect 
to production-inves tment  opportunity sets  used in the study is too restr ictive.  
If, as has been argued, auditor  choice is endogenous to a contracting 
equilibrium in the firm, acquirors who are involved with, or plan to be 
involved with acquisitions, may value skills of auditors with respect  to the 
takeover process and subsequent  events.  In this respect it would be expected 
that  large, geographically dispersed auditors would be sui ted to acquirors’ 
demands for this skill. In addition to corporate services departments  to advise 
on aspects of takeover  operat ions,  these auditor  firms have "industry" experts  
in place irrespective of the type of client firm acquired in the takeover. As 
with description and measurement of "value" in the takeover process in general,  
empirical proxies which capture this auditor  takeover  skill are difficult to 
design. For example, one possibility is to proxy the takeover  skill of the 
auditor  by identifying auditors of mult i-acquirors.  However, the presumption in 
operat ion of this variable, that  takeover skill is associated with frequent  
takeover operators ,  may be confounded by the skill being acquired in a series 
of "once only" acquisitions or the auditor  being associated with a number of 
ta rge t  firms.
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5.4 Motivations for Vertical and Horizontal Integration
Our results indicate (different from our predictions) that if a takeover 
is motivated by horizontal integration of acquiror and target then the auditor 
of the target is likely to be retained while for vertical integrations the 
target’s auditor is switched. A potential explanation for this result is that 
horizontal acquisitions may represent acquisitions of growth options while 
vertical integrations may be acquisitions of assets-in-place. The reason is
that in a horizontal acquisition acquirors are staying within their current line
of business but are attempting to acquire options on investments. In a
vertical acquisition assets-in-place are acquired (either upstream or 
downstream) to avoid hold out problems. Consistent with contracting efficiency 
described in Section 1, the proposition emerges that auditors of firms with 
growth options could reduce contracting costs by efficient monitoring of the 
exercise of the options and would therefore be retained following a takeover. 
A difficulty in making a strong prediction is that the acquiror’s auditor could 
have been through the same process, albeit with some lag, of the acquiror 
exercising options so that the differential expertise between the acquiror’s and 
target’s auditor in this respect is negligible. In a vertical integration where
assets-in-place are acquired, the auditor may be switched because of the 
advantages which might result in auditor uniformity when transfer pricing 
between divisions is involved.
To test this proposition we correlated the ratio of the book value of 
assets to the market value of the firm12 (a proxy for growth options) with
TZ The market value of the firm was proxied by the sum of the book 
value of debt, book value of preference shares and market value of 
equity.
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RATING. If the relationships suggested above hold, a negative correlation
would be expected. A Pearson correlation applied to 68 firms in the sample,
resulted in a te s t  s ta t is t ic  of -0.065, indicating tha t no relationship exists.
5.5 Proxy Variables
One po ten tia l  explanation for the ambiguous results  could rest with the 
proxy variables selected for differences in the expertise  of the ta rg e t ’s and
acquiror’s auditors. To investigate  this possibility further, te s ts  were
performed classifying the auditors into size groups. D ifferen tia ting  auditors 
according to their size13 is an a ttem pt to capture he terogeneity  in the supply 
of some audit product a t tr ib u tes  particularly  auditor repu ta tion  for
independence and their geographical proximity to clients. The Top 15 audit 
firms were ranked (based on audit fees earned) 15 down to 1 and firms 
outside the Top 15 were ranked 0.14
Using this auditor size variable, it was hypothesized tha t the smaller the
differences in the rank of the auditor of the acquiror and the auditor of the 
ta rge t,  the more audit product a t tr ib u te s  the auditors have in common and the 
more likely a switch of auditor to the auditor of the acquiror. A ‘t ’- t e s t  on
Size classifications have been used in o ther switching studies (eg., Healy
and Lys 1986, Francis and Wilson 1988).
The ranking system reflects  the available da ta  on audit fees in the
period of study. Three rankings were used for d iffe ren t sub-periods in 
the study. The Chartac No. 40, rankings for 1978 were used for
takeovers in 1978 -  1981. The Who A ud its  A ustralia  rankings for 1983 
were used for takeovers in 1982 and 1983. The Who A ud its  Australia  
and N ew  Z ealand  rankings for 1984 were used for takeovers in 1984
and 1985. No other published rankings were available for the period of 
the study.
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the differences in auditor  size between the sample of switches and non­
switches was not significant, (p = .157, one- ta i led) .15
Consistent with the argument for using this variable,  differences in the 
geographical location of ta rge t  and acquiror operat ions were also measured. 
The number of d if ferent  Austral ian States  in which the acquiror and ta rge t  
opera ted was proxied using disclosures made on the location of the head office 
of each subsidiary of the acquiror and ta rge t  in the company annual reports. 
With this variable,  it was hypothesized tha t  the smaller  the number of 
different  States,  the g rea te r  the overlap in the geographical proximity supplied 
by the auditors of the acquiror and the ta rge t  and the more likely a switch 
of auditor  to the auditor  of the acquiror. A V  -  test  on the variable
between the switching and non-switching groups was not significant (p = .249, 
one - ta i led )16.
5.6 Other  Design Problems
Some of our tests  were performed on very small samples, and the
sampling was from a limited time period. The ex tent to which these
l imitations af fec ted the results of the study can only be revealed through
fur ther  research.
TS
16
Mann-Whitney test  was significant at p = .192 (one-tai led).  
Mann-Whitney test  was significant at p = .231 (one-ta i led).
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U nivaria te  V  tests  (o n e- ta iled )  Hypothesis H I for A ustralian takeovers  1978- 
1985 according to w hether the acquiror switches the ta rg e t ’s auditor to the
acquiror’s auditor.









Rating of Type 













The relation between pre takeover auditors of the acquiror and target and the 
switching of the target’s auditor to the acquiror’s auditor
Switch
Yes No
Do the acquiror and Yes 0 12




2 = 22.629, p == .0000
Table 4
The rela t ion between resistance by ta rge t  management to a takeover and the 
switching of the t a rg e t ’s auditor to the acquiror’s auditor
Switch
Yes No
Does management resist No 40 23
the takeover offer? Yes 4 _5
44 28
2 = 1.202, p = .273
Table 5
Coefficients of OLS regression of auditor switch (SWIT) against takeover rating 
(RATING), absolute differences in secured leverage (DIFSD), ta rge t 
management’s recommendation on takeover (RECOMM), same auditor (SAMAUD) 
and percentage of control acquired (AMTACQ) with Y  s tatis tics  





t - s t a t O n e - ta i led
Probability
constant 0.146 0.230 0.409
RATING + -0.049 -2.246 0.014
DIFSD + 0.289 1.742 0.043
RECOMM + -0.308 -2.108 0.019
SAMAUD + 0.746 6.068 0.000
AMTACQ 0.005 0.755 0.226
Table 6
C o rr e la t io n  M atr ix
D IF S D R A T IN G R EC O M M SA M A U D
R A T IN G - 0 .0 4 9
R E C O M M 0.106 - 0 .0 3 5
SA M A U D - 0 .0 2 1 - 0 .0 1 8 0 .056
A M TA CQ 0.063 0.025 0 .309 0 .024
